Searching, ranking and hiring by Russo, G. & Schettkat, R.
Y der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometric
Serie research memoranda
Searching, Ranking and Hiring
Giovanni Russo
Cees Corter
Ronald Schettkat
Research Memorandum 1997. .17 March 1997
applied
labour
economics
research
team
vrije Universiteit amsterdam
Searching, Ranking and Hiring
Giovanni Russo*/ Cees Garter*/  Ronald Schettkat**
* Free University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Department of Regional Economics
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Tel + 3 l-20-4446093
Fax + 3 l-20-4446004
** University of Utrecht
Department of Socio and Institutional Economics
Heidelberglaan 1
Postbus  80140
3508 TC Utrecht
The Netherlands
Tel +31-30-2531959
Fax +31-30-2531619
Email  R.Schettkat@fsw.ruu.nl
Abstract
This paper analyses employers’ recruitment strategies (in terms of search channel
used, and applicants’ characteristics) in response to different conditions on the
relevant regional labour  market. In particular we were able to formulate two
hypotheses on the nature of the adjustments:
(1) The use of the labour  exchange office and the hiring of unemployed candidates
are events more likely to happen in a slack regional labour  market. The use of
advertisement and the hiring of already employed job seekers are more likely
to occur in presence of excess demand on the relevant regional labour  market;
(2) The process leading to the choice of the recruitment channel and the outcome
of the recruitment process in terms of the characteristics of the hired
applicants are correlated.
The recruitment behaviour we find in our data is consistent with a theoretical ranking
model (Blanchard and Diamond 1994) but it less likely to be induced by endogenous
creation of good jobs during periods of excess demand as modelled  in Pissarides
(1994). In fact the composition of the educational requirements among the vacant
jobs appears to be rather constant. This support the view that shifts in recruitment
strategies are driven by changes in expected recruitment costs and variations (both in
size and composition) of the pool of available applicants.
21. Introduction
A common result of studies on gross job creation and destruction (Leonard 1987,
Davis and Haltiwanger 1992, Cramer and Koller 1988) is that both take place
simultaneously at any time of the business cycle, i.e., in shrinking as well as in
expanding industries. Job search and hiring are therefore continuous activities in
dynamic economies (Holt and David 1966). However, search and hiring intensity vary
over the business cycle and furthermore, activities on the one side of the market have
external effects on the costs of the other market side (thin and thick markets effects,
Diamond 1982). Along this line Christopher Pissarides (1994) has published a model
with on-the-job search and two categories of jobs, good and bad, in a recent issue of
The Review of Economic Studies. In his model on-the-job search reduces employers’
search and hiring costs for good jobs and this makes more good jobs profitable if
more employed workers search (thick market). This model is consistent with observed
procyclical on-the-job search and quits and it predicts a higher share of already
employed workers being hired during booms when a high proportion of good jobs is
being created. In a recession, on the other hand, hiring from unemployment would be
more important because of a higher proportion of bad jobs being created. Thus in the
Pissarides framework hiring from different pools is driven by the creation of different
types of jobs, good and bad.
In the same issue of The Review of Economic Studies Olivier Blanchard and Peter
Diamond (1994) developed a model of employers’ hiring decisions depending on the
duration of unemployment in case of multiple applications. In their model the short-
term unemployed are preferred over the long-term unemployed (ranking) and in slack
labour  markets the chance of getting a job declines rapidly with unemployment
duration. Extending the Blanchard and Diamond model to hiring from the ranks of
the employed one expects the employed to be ranked over the short-term
unemployed in “normal” times when becoming unemployed is more likely to be
caused by personal characteristics, that is by a negative selection of former employers.
If the economy moves into a recession general economic conditions may be more
important than personal characteristics in determining who is becoming unemployed.
In this case the newly unemployed may be ranked equally to the employed.
Furthermore, if ranking by unemployment duration is taking place the newly
unemployed have a strong incentive to search intensively in order to avoid long-term
unemployment and a depreciation in their future wages (Schettkat 1995).
In case of ranking we expect hiring to shift from unemployment to employment if the
economy moves out of a recession even if the quality of vacant jobs does not change
over the business cycle. Both the Pissarides model as well as the extended ranking
model of Blanchard and Diamond are consistent with observed gross worker flows in
the Dutch labour  market as illustrated in Figure 1. The outflow from unemployment
becomes more important during the recession in the eighties, but it becomes much
less important during the recovery at the end of the eighties / beginning of the
nineties. On the other hand, the importance of job-to-job transitions is less evident
during the recession in the eigthies, but they become much more important during the
economic expansion at the beginning ot the nineties.
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In general employers can activate different search channels to reach certain groups of
job seekers. Labour  exchange offices, for example, best reach unemployed workers,
whereas advertisements appears to best reach employed workers. In this paper we
aim to illuminate the firms’ recruitment strategy given a varying search intensity and a
different composition of job seekers over the business cycle. We first develop a simple
economic model of employers recruitment behaviour. We then make use of a unique
data set on filled vacancies to investigate the relationship empirically. In particular we
control for skill requirements of vacancies when analyzing the firms’ choice of the
recruitment channel. We are able to distinguish between the relative importance of a
higher proportion of good jobs being created in tight labour  markets a shift of the
recruitment channel and corresponding hiring pool, respectively. We investigate
whether employers vary their hiring strategy in response to changes in the macro
economic conditions. Even if the Pissarides argument is correct that in booms more
good jobs are created, we can still study whether for a given skill level of vacancies
employers respond to changing labor market conditions and varying hiring costs.
The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 contains the economic search
model, while Section 3 presents the functioning of the model. Section 4 contains the
description of the data set, and Section 5 introduces the statistical model. Section 6
presents the results of the empirical estimation while Section 7 finally concludes.
2. An Economic Model of Recruitment
The recruitment process is framed in terms of a search model in which the firm
decides on the reservation level of productivity and on the recruitment channels to
activate taking into account the behaviour of its counterpart and the conditions on the
labour  market. The benefits employers derive from a match, denoted by r, is defined
as the net productivity attached to the vacant position that is the discounted expected
productivity minus the wage and hiring costs. Searchers are assumed to maximize the
sum of current and expected future utility when faced with uncertain market condi-
tions. The expected future benefits is a weighted average of the utility derived from
continuing search and of the utility derived from hiring an applicant. The weights are
the occurrence probabilities of each of these two events. On having a vacant positions
employers enter the labour  market seeking for suitable applicants. Applications to
form an employment relationship arrive at the rate 6,  (d 6,Jds  > 0 ; d26Jds  * < 0)
depending on the search strategy (m) adopted. The firm chooses the optimal recruit-
ment strategy (subscript g) from the set of all possible search strategies (M). The
search strategy consists of the choice of the number (and composition) of search
channels to be activated, while it is assumed that every firm has at its disposal the
same number of search channels. In this case, M - the set of all possible search
strategies - is a finite set composed of the combination of the number of recruitment
channels. So, for the optimal strategy (g) we have:
ug  = max  IJ, (1)mcbf
where U m is the expected net benefit from the adoption of strategy m. Let V,,,(  ?r)
denote the expected discounted lifetime benefit flow in an employment relationship
characterized by net productivity flow 7r  (V ,,,=  r/r)  and discount rate r. The net
benefit of strategy m, satisfies the following equation:
rU, = -x cjsj + qJSl..Sj) 7m=IVm(x)-U,,oldF,(~) (2)
jcm -a
where c represents the channel-specific variable costs, sj represents the search
intensity via the search channel j (i E m, with non-negative values) and F,  is the
productivity distribution in the population reached by the search strategy m. The firm
can compute the utility derived from each of the search strategies and will adopt the
strategy that yields the highest returns (g). If we assume a stationary environment, the
following first-order conditions determine the value of the reservation productivity
(r,,J and the search channels’ use:
(3)
Hence, each search channel is utilized up to the level where the expected marginal
costs equal the expected marginal benefits. ’ *
’ In the present paper we mainly focus on the choice of the search strategy. Notice that in case two
search channels are activated, it can very well be the case that one of the search methods is operative
while the second one is kept latent for a certain period; thereafter both search channels are operative.
For further research on the timing in the openings of search channels we refer to Gorter and Van
Ommeren (1994),  where the process has been investigated by means of multivariate duration analysis.
5Different search strategies reach different segments of the working population and
consequently different shares of job seekers. Let us denote by ys the share of all
potential job seekers reached by search strategy g. Not every contact will result in a
reaction (or application), it depends on the job seekers’ reservation wage (wage offer
distribution). So the applicants arrival rate for the firm reads as follows:
bg = Yg[l-Fjs*wl (4)
where g is the optimal search strategy for employers and h is the optimal search
strategy for job seekers (subscript js) and 4 is the reservation wage.
Inserting equation (4) in equation (2) and by using the first order conditions we
obtain
q,+k  =8 Y,P  -&(E1)l/[*  --rl,W,(~) where kg  = c  cjsj (5)
‘II icg
Equation (5) describes the employers reaction function. Employers when choosing
their search strategy take into account the behaviour of job seekers 3. In particular,
the choice of the number of search channels and of the reservation productivity
determines the probability that an applicant is hired for the position concerned (the
hazard rate) as follows: 8,= &Jl-F.&Q].  In other words, the search method affects the
offer intensity, while the reservation productivity determines the probability of the
applicant being acceptable. Clearly, both the rate of arrival of applicants and the
acceptance probability depend on the recruitment channel/s  chosen (see Russo et al.
1995a) and also on the conditions of the labour  market.
Certain search channels reach specific candidates better than others, in particular,
unemployed job seekers are more likely to be found via the labour  exchange office
(leo), while already employed job seekers are basically to be reached by placing
advertisements (adv) (see e.g., Gorter et al. 1993, Van Ours 1994, Lindeboom et al.
1994). There is a trade-off intrinsic in the choice between these two search channels,
the leo is less expensive (cleo<  cadv),  while adv generally guarantees a higher contact
rate ( Y~~~>Y,J.  Firms appear to use basically only one search channel (84% of the
employers in our sample on job vacancies used only 1 search channel). Therefore, we
will concentrate on the relationship between the choice of the recruitment channel
(adv vs. leo) and the choice in terms of applicants’ characteristics (unemployed vs.
employed).
’ Let us define d - a dummy variable signalling whether a given recruitment channel has been
included in the optimal strategy g - as follows:
d.  = Wi bg
I i1ifjEg
in other words, employers choose the number and composition of the search channels activated (i.e., the
optimal recruitment strategy).
3 This model is rather simple and is not meant as a complete explanation of the behaviour of seekers
in the labour  market. This model can be extended to incorporate endogenous quit into unemployment
and non stationarity (Burdett and Wright 1994); in order to incorporate job to job transitions one should
include on the job search and moving costs, while to incorporate transition in and out the labour  force
non wage utility offers should be added.
6To summarize, if different conditions on the labour  market affect agents perception
of expected costs and benefits associated with the recruitment activity, then it may be
expected that also the choice of the recruitment strategy (composition of the set of
dummies dJ will vary with the economic conditions on the relevant labour  market,
thus reflecting the change in importance of certain key aspects of recruitment.
3. Labour Market Conditions and Firms’ Recruitment Strategies
In this section we discuss the impact of different labour  market conditions on the
recruitment strategy and on the hiring decision. We can identify three critical factors
when comparing a period of economic recession with a period of economic expansion
(for the same type of vacancy):
1) Demand side effect (quality effect).
Unemployed job seekers have (when controlled for skills) a lower reservation wage
than already employed job seekers. The only  reason why employers are hesitant to
hire unemployed workers is that they expect their productivity to be lower than the
productivity of employed workers 4. That is, in terms of our model, the expected
productivity distribution of an unemployed worker is located to the left of the
productivity distribution of an employed workers (E FU(  r) < E{(  r)) and the differential
in expected productivity is greater than the wage differential. This is sometimes
labelled  as signalling (Spence 1973) or as the stigma effect of unemployment.
The stigma effect gets stronger with the duration of unemployment (due to ranking,
see Blanchard and Diamond 1994). The expected productivity differential between
unemployed and employed applicants tends to decline when the economy moves into
a recession because newly unemployed workers are regarded to be hit by general
economic conditions rather than by negative selection of their former employer. If we
couple the presence of the stigma effect with the difference in wages, it is more
attractive for employers to recruit from among the unemployed in recessions. We
therefore expect to observe an increase in the use of the search channel that is best
suited to reach the unemployed during recessions.
2) Supply Side Effect (quality/composition effect).
On-the-job search is driven by two factors (Schettkat 1995): (i) an increase in the
utility of search for employed workers (better wages or better working conditions), (ii)
an increase in the security of their job. During recessions jobs that offer higher wages
are hard to find, not least because the unemployed (see 1) are competing with
employed job seekers.
In addition, if changing the job turns out to be a mistake there are less opportunities
to adjust, that is, to change job one more time. Consequently, during recessions, the
pool of job seekers tend to be composed mainly by unemployed workers. On the
contrary, during expansions the pool of job seekers would tend to include relatively
more employed workers.
4 Note that it is sufficient that employers expect these two groups to have different productivity.
73) Supply Side (quantity effect).
During a recession unemployed agents tend to increase their search effort to escape
unemployment as soon as possible to prevent the stigma effect related to long-term
unemployment. At the same time, the pool of unemployed job seekers tends to be
larger. Moreover, alternatives available to job seekers are scarcer and this will lower
their reservation level of utility. On the whole, this will lead to a higher number of
reactions (via all recruitment channels) during times of a recession.
These three effects together with search channel specific characteristics (costs, contact
rate, and target groups) will determine the choice of the optimal search strategy of
employers. That is we expect firms to face asymmetries in hiring costs over the
business cycle (see also Schettkat 1995). In particular, during recessions we might
observe the following: (i) cheaper recruitment strategies; (ii) less search effort of
firms; (iii) higher search effort of (unemployed) workers, (iv) lower reservation wages
and wage offers (“cheaper” candidates). In contrast, during economic expansions, the
hiring costs structure might be characterized by the following: (i) more expensive
recruitment strategies; (ii) more search effort of firms (competition for applicants);
(iii) less search effort of workers, (iv) higher reservation wages and wage offers
(“expensive” candidates).
In terms of the structural parameters of the search model the effects mentioned can
be summarized as shown in Table 1. In this framework both the expected costs and
the expected benefits from the search activity vary with the condition of the labour
market. Expected costs vary in relation to the level of effort put into the search
activity, and the expected benefits vary with the productivity distribution among the
population. In other words, the main reasons why employers would use different
channels with different conditions of the labour  market are threefold: (i) when the
expected productivity gap between unemployed job seekers and already employed job
seekers narrows while unemployed job seekers tend to have a lower reservation wage,
it is worth to hire from unemployment (i.e., the expected net benefit shifts in favour
of the unemployed); (ii) the composition of the pool of potential applicants changes,
during recessions it consists mainly of unemployed workers because employed workers
do not search (quits are procyclical), while during expansions it is more diversified
thus, in the latter case, it may be worth to adopt a search channel with a larger
spectrum; (iii) the number of vacancies increases and employers usually compete for
scarce applicants. On the other hand, during a recession the number of reactions per
vacancy increases because job seekers tend to search harder to escape from
unemployment, and employers may devote less effort to the search activity.
8Table 1: The impact of different labour  market conditions on the parameters of the search model (for
the same type of vacancy) when comparing adv and leo.
general differences
(#3: quantity effect)
SLack  Labour  Market
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The implications listed above lead to the following two hypotheses:
(1) During recessions employers recruitment activities shift to the use of leo
because the unemployed are considered to be more attractive (relative to
employed workers; the extended Blanchard and Diamond model) and the size
of the pool of applicants increases. During expansions, on the other hand,
employers shift to any of the remaining search channels (and in particular adv)
together with the hiring of an already employed candidate. These shifts appear
even if the quality of jobs (vacancies) is controlled for (i.e., the Pissarides
effect of better jobs during expansions).
(2) The choice of the search channel and the expected outcome of the recruitment
process in terms of the characteristics of the hired applicants are correlated.
4. Data and Method
The data set used for the empirical application, is derived from a survey on the
recruitment behaviour of Dutch firms “How do firms recruit?“. The questionnaire for
this survey is sent to a random sample of Dutch firms every second months of the
year, that is each year contains 6 waves. We will use data for the years ranging from
1991 to 1994, a period which represents two years of tight labour  market (1991 and
1992) and two years of slack labour  market (1993 and 1994).
At the aggregate level, we clearly observe the different labour  market conditions in
these four years (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). From these overall pictures, it also
emerges that the share of vacancies filled at the labour  exchange office in general,
and the share of vacancies filled by non-employed job seekers in particular, is
9remarkably larger in 1993 and 1994 than in 1991 and 1992.
Figure 2: The relationship between the total number
of matches, the role of the leo and the share of
vacancies won by non-employed job seekers (Source:
CBS, and Central Employment Agency).
Figure 3: The share of vacancies tilled at the
leo and the relative share won by non-
employed job seekers (Source: Central
Employment Agency).
In the survey firms are asked inter alia whether they filled any vacancy in the past
two months. For each observation in the data set, we have background information on
both firm and vacancy characteristics, and the region where the firm is located.
Besides, the survey provides information on elements of the recruitment process such
as the duration of the recruitment process, the number of (identical) vacancies
posted, the number of applications received, and the number of search channels used.
Moreover, the survey records the recruitment channels used and the first recruitment
channel activated. We classified the recruitment channels into five categories:
Informal that includes employee referrals, friends and relatives, self-initiated
applications; Advertisements (or adv) in newspapers; Temporary Placement Offices
(or tpo); Labour  Exchange Offices (or leo); and the residual category Others that
includes, among others, the use of school recruitment and private employment
agencies (head hunters).
The previous labour  market position of hired applicants (denoted as plmp) is
classified into three groups of job seekers: Unemployed (u), Already Employed (e),
and School Leavers (~1).  So far for the characteristics at the micro (firm) level.
Next, we need to capture the impact of the general conditions on the labour  market
over time. To this end we use two aggregate economic indicators (one for the demand
side, and one for the supply side) at the meso level’. We opted for two indicators
instead of the usual U/V ratio, because recently Gorter and Van Ours (1996) found
that the demand side tends to be the driving force in the labour  market !
5 The twelve administrative provinces in the Netherlands. Including the regional variation is also
essential because of the time span covered by the data is limited (only 4 years).
6 A complete analysis of the efficiency of Dutch regional labour  markets at an aggregate level can be
found in Gorter (1991),  Goner and Van Ours (1994),  and Gorter et al. (1995).
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Consequently, in order to disentangle the effects due to labour  demand from those
due to labour  supply we considered the two sides of the labour  market separately.
The condition of the labour  demand is captured by the yearly stock of vacancies in
the province divided by the total employment in the province; this variable should
provide a rough measure of the degree of competition for applicants among
employers with vacancies. As far as the supply side is concerned, a natural measure of
the availability of job seekers is given by the percentage of registered unemployed at
the provincial level. This variable should be able to roughly gauge the degree of
competition for vacancies among job seekers.
The data set is treated as a pool of cross-sections, and to account for that, we
introduced both yearly and seasonal dummies. If the survey refers to the period
January-February the first seasonal dummy takes on the value 1 (wl = 1); and zero
otherwise. The remaining waves are: March-April (w2  = 1)) May-June (w3  = 1)) July-
August (w4=  l), September-October (w5  = l), November-December (w6=  1).
To control for a possible stock composition effect (that is, good jobs are created
during expansions while bad jobs are created during recessions; as in Pissarides 1994),
we controlled the distribution of educational requirements in our sample (educational
requirements are used as proxy for the quality of the job). 7 Surprisingly, the
distribution of the educational requirements over the observed time period is rather
stable; with 23% of the vacancies requiring high (university and higher vocational)
education, 7 % requiring secondary (general) education, 3 1% requiring secondary
(vocational) education, 30% requiring primary (vocational) education and finally 9%
requiring primary (general) education.
The aim is to investigate the relationship between the choice of the recruitment
strategy and the employers’ options in term of applicants’ characteristics, therefore we
considered firms having only one vacancy and using only one recruitment channel.
After deleting missing cases, 9900 complete observations were kept. Descriptive
statistics for some of the key variables are given in Table 2. On the aggregate, both
the average number of reactions and the average number of unemployed job seekers
appear to increase as the general economic conditions worsen (the average number of
employed job seekers hired decrease). This can be seen as an early support for our
conjecture. More information on tha data is given in Appendix 1.
In the next Section the econometric models used in the empirical analysis of the data
set described so far will be introduced.
5. The Econometric Model and Preliminary Analysis
In this section we will model the relationship between the choice of the recruitment
channel and the expected outcome of the recruitment process. If we assume perfect
foresight on the part of employers the expected outcome of the recruitment process
can be approximated by the actual hiring decision (motives can be also discovered
from actual behaviour, Beweley 1995). Consistently with the model presented in
’ It may be, however, that educational requirements for a specific job vary with different conditions
on the local labour market.
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Section 2, employers choose the optimal search strategy 8 anticipating the behaviour
of job seekers.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, the data set refers to those firms with one vacancy that used one
recruitment channel only.
Recruitment
Charnel
Informal
Advertisement
TPO
LEO
Others
Total
average vacancy
duration (days)
average (%)
unemployment
average rate
f-w=y X
3713 37.5
2953 29.8
896 9.0
1144 11.6
1194 12.1
9900 100.0
1991
38.87
5.33
0.15
vacancy/employment
average # 8.85
applicants
hired applicant
employed 0.66
unemployed 0.18
school leavers 0.16
educational requirements
university 0.20
secondary 0.07
secondary vocational 0.31
primary vocational 0.34
primary 0.08
number of observations 2156
average duration average 1 hired applicant
(in day-s) applicants enployed menployed  school leaver
29.54 3.53 0.61 0.23 0.16
43.76 28.79 0.70 0.17 0.12
26.20 4.43 0.60 0.28 0.11
30.20 6.32 0.30 0.49 0.21
43.84 6.61 0.47 0.20 0.32
individual years
1992 1993
36.45 33.67
5.34 6.70
0.09 0.05
11.09 13.21
1994
32.65
7.72
0.06
13.52
0.63 0.55 0.51
0.21 0.28 0.30
0.16 0.17 0.19
0.21 0.24 0.27
0.07 0.07 0.05
0.31 0.31 0.29
0.33 0.28 0.30
0.08 0.10 0.09
2651 2486 2607
The recruitment channel choice and the outcome of the recruitment process are thus
interrelated and consequently, they have to be modelled  simultaneously. Profit
’ In the present analysis we will restrict ourselves to recruitment strategies with only 1 search
channel.
maximizing firms will choose the pair (search channel, preferred applicant) yielding
the maximum utility (U) among all possible pairs (search channel, preferred
applicant). Let us denote the pair yielding the maximum utility with A; with T we
denote the set of all possible pairs (search channel-preferred applicant), and its
generic element is denoted by a. U can be thought of as the result of a comparison
between expected costs and expected benefits (via F,  the productivity distribution) of
using a certain recruitment strategy for a candidate with certain characteristics. That
is, the firm will choose the pair A if the condition U .=Max,U  a holds. Next, we will
assume that this utility U can be factorized into a deterministic component and a
stochastic component as follows: U A= W,+  E& The deterministic component is
assumed to be a function of a vector of vacancy characteristics, firm characteristics,
and labour  market conditions, WA=  W,(x). With random utility U and a feasible
choice set T, and the disturbances E, are independently identically distributed
according to a Weibull (type II) distribution we obtain a multinomial logit  model (see
Cramer 1991). This implies that PA - the probability that the pair A is chosen - reads
as follows:
PA = exp(W,)
z exp(Wa)
(6)
To obtain a first impression of the importance of the relationship between the choice
of the recruitment strategy and the characteristics of the hired applicant we present
the contingency table for the sample at disposal in Table 3. The Pearson statistic 9
immediately signals the presence of a relationship between the two classifications. In
particular, we are interested in the relationship between the choice of adv or leo on
the one hand and the choice of an unemployed or already employed person on the
other hand (see Section 2). This interdependency appears to be (in line with our prior
expectations) significant for the four pairs of interest: advertisement-employed,
advertisement-unemployed, leo-employed, leo-unemployed.
Let us denote by d (as in Section 2) the indicator for the choice of the search channel
and with plmp the indicator for the expected characteristics of the hired applicants.
Thus d= 1 if the indicated search channel is chosen and pimp=  1 if the hired
applicants shows the characteristic considered.
The joint logit  probability for each of the selected pairs reads as follows:
9 The Pearson statistic P is computed in the following way:
p = c [NC, -N(Nc.IN)(NblN)PIN(N.lN)(NblN)
c b
where c is the number of recruitment channels (5) and b is the number of the states (PLMP, 3), N is the
number of observation in the sample (9900) and N,  and N ,b  are the marginal distributions.
P(d=l,PLMP=l)  =
ealX
; P(d=l,PLMP=O)  =
e Pzx
1 3
(7)
; P(d=O,PLMP=O) = ’
In other words, we considered four models, one for each of the above mentioned
pairs lo. From equation (7) one can derive the following conditional probabilities:
p x+aPL.MP
f’(d=  lIf’~f’)  = e 2p2i+epup
x+ad
;  P(PLMP=lld)  = ep3
l+e 1 +e
Q+sd
(8)
where pi are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and cr=(Pr&/3Jx  can  be
interpreted as a measure of association (correlation) between the two processes
(Boehm 1980, Maddala 1985). The strength of this model is that from the coefficients
estimated from the multinomial logit  model specified in equation (7) one can directly
make inference on the effect of the independent variables on the conditional
probabilities (see also Boehm 1980).
Table 3: Contingency table for the recruitment channel used and the outcome of the recruitment process.
Recruitment Previous Labour Market Position of the Hired Applicant (b)
Charnel (cl
Employed Unemployed School Leavers NC.
Informal 2260 (3.56) 848 (3.71) 605 (1.42) 3713 0.375
Advertisement 2081 (73) 515 (58.37) 357 (42.88) 2953 0.298
Tpo 541 (0.37) 255 (5,571 100 (18.94) 896 0.091
Leo 342 (162.05) 557 (274.03) 245 (12.25) 1144 0.116
Others 567 (25.61) 239 (9.62) 388 (163.36) 1194 0.121
5791 2414 1695 N= 9900
N.b 0.585 0.244 0.171 1
The contributions to the Pearson statistic of the cells are given in parenthesis.
Pearson statistic q 856.76 significant at 5% (x2(8)=22  at 5%)
6. Estimation Results
In this section we discuss the results of the multinomial logit  model as specified in
equation (7). From these estimates it is possible to gauge the effect of regional labour
market conditions on the choice of the recruitment channel (adv vs. leo) and on the
‘O Let us consider, for example, the couple advertisement-employed the pair d= 1 and pimp=  1
indicates the use of advertisement and the choice for an employed job seeker; the pair d=O and plmp=O
indicates the non use of advertisement and the hiring of a non employed applicant; the pair d= 1 and
plmp=O indicates the use of advertisement and the hiring of a non employed applicant; and finally the
pair d=O and pimp=  1 indicates the non use of advertisement and the hiring of an employed candidate.
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outcome of the recruitment process (employed vs. unemployed); consequently, we are
able to test the implications of the first hypothesis stated in Section 2.
To test the second hypothesis (that is in slack labour  market hiring shifts to the pool
of unemployed job seekers) we use the conditional probabilities (based on the
multinomial logit  model) as specified in equation (8),  and in particular the
coefficient CY  that represents the degree of association between the two processes: the
choice of the search channel and the outcome of the recruitment process in terms of
the previous labour  market position of the hired applicant).
We begin our analysis by considering the choice of the search channel and the
outcome of the recruitment process as two independent processes (that is, we impose
a=O).  In this setting the impact of the conditions on the labour  market on the two
processes can be investigated by means of independent multinomial logit  models. The
estimates of the impact of the regional labour  market conditions on the choice of the
recruitment channel are presented in Table 4. Consistent with the analysis in Section
2, it appears that in a slack labour  market the informal channel is (significantly)
preferred over advertisement and this relation holds for an excess supply of labour
(high unemployment rate, first column in Table 4) and for low unsatisfied demand
(low vacancy rate, second column in Table 4). The informal search channel is
significantly preferred over the leo when the vacancy rate is high but the shift to the
leo in slack labour  market is insignificant. This result can be interpreted as support
for the finding in Gorter and Van Ours (1996) that the demand side of the labour
market dominates the search process. The results are very clear for the choice
between adv and leo and tpo and leo. High unemployment shifts the odds
significantly in favour for leo and high vacancy rate shifts the odds away from leo.
We now consider the effect of the regional labour  market conditions on employers’
choice in terms of applicants characteristics. The results are put together in Table 5.
Table 4: Logit coefficients for the effect of the conditions on the labour market on the choice of the
search channel (standard errors in parenthesis; *: significant at 5%).
choice of the recruitlnent  charnel menployment rate l(rvacancies/employment
informal/advertisement 0.70 (0.25)* -3.08 (1.20)*
informal/tpo 0.51 (0.36) -0.61 (1.83)
informal/Leo -0.46 (0.29) 3.53 (1.73)*
informal/others 0.09 (0.30) 0.49 (1.65)
advertisement/tpo -0.18 (0.38) 2.47 (1.85)
advertisement/lea -1.15 (0.32)* 6.61 (1.78)*
advertisement/others -0.60 (0.33) 3.57 (1.67)*
tpo/leo -0.97 (0.41)* 4.41 (2.24)*
tpo/others -0.42 (0.43) 1.10 (2.18)
Leo/others 0.55 (0.36) -3.04 (2.09)
The remaining control variables are those used in the full model presented in Table 6.
Again the results seem to be consistent with our analysis in Section 2: in labour
markets with excess of demand (high vacancy rate) employed applicants tend to be
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hired (second column in Table 5))  l1 whereas excess of supply of labour  (first column
in Table 5) leads to a significant shift to hiring from among the unemployed job
seekers. Thus, if we treat the choice of the recruitment channel and hiring from the
pools of the unemployed or unemployed as independent the estimation results
confirm our theoretical considerations. This is already interesting per se, but more
insight into the recruitment process can be obtained by investigating the mutual
relationship between the recruitment channel choice and the selected applicant’s
characteristic as presented in equation (8). ‘*
Table 5: Logit  coefficients for the effect of the conditions on the labour  market on the outcome of the
recruitment process (standard errors in parenthesis; *: significant at 5%).
outcome of recruitmnt
unemployment rate lO*vacancies/empLoyment
school leavers/employed 0 .61  (O-25)* -6 .28  (l-35)*
school Leavers/unemployed 0.16 (0.28) -2.76 (1.58)
employed/unemployed -0 .45  (0.22)* 3 .52  (1.25)*
The remaining control variables are those used in the full model presented in Table 6.
The result of the estimates for the pairs advertisement-employed and advertisement-
unemployed are given in Table 6. The coefficients p2 refer to the probability of
activation of a certain search channel conditional on the characteristic of the desired
applicant. The coefficients & refer to the probability of hiring a candidate with
certain characteristics conditional on the choice of the search channel. We
concentrate mainly on these two parameters ( p2 and 0;). Conditional on employers’
choices of candidates, advertisements appear to be chosen when the vacancy rate is
high (see rows under “labour  market conditions”). Conditional on the choice of the
search channel, the likelihood of hiring an already employed applicant is higher in
times of high labour  demand (& P(plmp 1 d)). In presence of high unemployment the
chances of hiring such an applicant are somewhat lowered (the coefficient is
significant at 10%); this may be induced by the absence of the stigma effect (that
renders unemployed job seekers more competitive) and by the relatively low number
‘I Already employed applicants may find in their actual job a term of comparison, and this provide
them with a better understanding of which problems may arise in the new employment. On the ground of
experience employed job seekers can better judge their suitability for the prospect employment.
Moreover, their decision is not driven by the pressure of external factors as may be the case for
unemployed job seekers who may try to leave unemployment before their status become a negative signal
for employers.
‘* Where cr=( or &@x  is evaluated at the sample average. The relative standard error has been
computed in the following way:
1’2
j=l
where N is the number of observations in the sample and K is the number of regressors (constant
included) used in the models.
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Table 6: Multinomial logit estimates. Reference groups: non employed applicants + non advertisement, and non unemployed applicants + non advertisement
(standard errors in parenthesis; *: significant at 5%).
constant
Advertisement - Employed
01 gZ P(d=lIplmp)
-1.02 (0.35)* -1.11 (0.44)*
83 P(pln@ IdI 81 82 Ip11+ 83 P(pln@ IdI
-0.43 (0.29) -1.88 (0.54)* -0.62 (0.30)* -0.32 (0.32)
educational requiremnts
university
secondary
secondary vocational
primary vocational
1.78 (0.13)* 0.29 (0.15)*
1.13 (0.17F 0.43 (o.la)*
1.35 (0.121* 0.19 (0.13)
0.32 (0.12)* -0.09 (0.13)
0.10 (0.02)* -0.00 (0.03)
0.88 (o.lo)* -1.10 (0.18)* 0.88 (o.ll)* -1.14 (o.ll)*
0.67 (0.13)* -0.63 (0.23)* 0.55 (0.14)* -0.77 (0.14)*
0.59 (0.09)* -0.52 (0.15)* 0.69 (O.ll)* -0.75 (0.09)*
0.05 (0.08) -0.27 (0.15) 0.17 (0.11) -0.25 (0.09)*
size/100 0.08 (0.02)* -0.07 (0.03)* 0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02)*
ecanomic  sector
industry -0.05 (0.09) -0.56 (0.13)* -0.05 (0.07) -0.60 (O-15)* -0.12 (0.08) -0.12 (0.08)
quaternary -0.02 (0.08) -0.07 (0.10) -0.08 (0.06) 0.09 (0.12) -0.08 (0.06) 0.16 (0.07)*
construction -0.36 (0.13)* -0.73 (0.16)* -0.35 (o.lo)* -0.36 (0.19) -0.15 (0.11) 0.42 (O.lO)*
transportation 0.09 (0.14) -0.33 (0.18) 0.21 (o.lo)* -0.29 (0.21) -0.06 (0.12) 0.20 (0.11)
labour market conditions
unempLoyment  rate -1.15 (O-29)* -0.48 (0.36) -0.38 (0.22) -0.30 (0.45) -0.79 (0.25)* 0.10 (0.24)
vacancies/employment 0.74 (o-14)* 0.46 (0.18)* 0.51 (0.12)* 0.46 (0.23)* 0.26 (0.12)* -0.31 (0.14)*
wave  and year
w2 March-April 0.03 (0.10) 0.26 (0.13)* 0.08 (0.09) 0.07 (0.15) -0.01 (0.09) -0.16 (0.09)
w3 May-June -0.36 (O.ll)* -0.08 (0.14) -0.27 (0.09)* -0.29 (0.17) -0.17 (0.09) -0.25 (0.09)'
w4 July-August -0.39 (o.lo)* -0.06 (0.14) -0.22 (0.09)* -0.19 (0.16) -0.27 (0.09)* -0.37 (o.lo)*
US September-October -0.38 (O.lO)* -0.17 (0.13) -0.15 (0.08) -0.29 (0.16) -0.30 (0.08)* -0.24 (O-09)*
w6 November-December -0.19 (0.11) -0.05 (0.14) 0.04 (0.09) -0.15 (0.16) -0.21 (o-09)* -0.09 (0.09)
1992 0.03 (0.12) -0.04 (0.15) 0.10 (0.10) 0.12 (0.19) -0.04 (0.09) 0.13 (0.11)
1993 -0.29 (0.15) -0.21 (0.20) 0.05 (0.13) 0.36 (0.25) -0.37 (0.13)* 0.25 (0.15)
1994 -0.65 (O-14)* -0.44 (0.18)* -0.11 (0.11) 0.18 (0.23) -0.56 (0.12)* 0.39 (o-13)*
Q 0.55 (0.33) -0.41 (0.36)
-2 Log likelihood for full model
-2 log likelihood for restricted model
number of observations
24,049.593 21,857.956
25,248.420 22,949.194
9,900 9,900
Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given in brackets: required education (primary), economic sector (services), wave (first wave, January-
Advertisemnt  - Unemployed
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of employed job seekers.
As far as the pair advertisement-unemployed is concerned, we find that conditional
on employers’ preferences about applicants (&),  advertisement appears to be
activated when the conditions on the labour  demand are relatively good, while the
contrary holds in periods of high unemployment. Conversely, conditional on the
choice of the recruitment strategy (03,  the hiring chances for unemployed candidates
are reduced in periods of excess labour  demand, While, the coefficient for the supply
side is positive but not significant, thus suggesting that unemployed applicants tend to
compete with already employed job seekers on equal footing.
To summarize the results so far, it appears that conditional on the employers’ choice
of the search channel, the chance of hiring an employed applicant is high when there
is excess demand and it is low (although to a less extent) when there is excess supply.
On the contrary, the chance of hiring unemployed applicants is low when there is
excess demand, but it is not increased when there is excess supply. Furthermore,
conditional on the employers’ choice of applicants’ characteristics, advertisement
seems to be used during periods when the vacancy rate is high. The contrary holds
when the unemployment rate is high.
For vacancies requiring high educational standards employers tend to rely on
advertisements and they seem to prefer already employed candidates. At the same
time, the chance for unemployed persons is significantly reduced. A positive effect for
the use of advertisement (when recruiting for positions requiring experience) on the
probability of hiring already employed applicants was found in Gorter et al. (1993).
The estimates referring the labour  exchange office (leo) are presented in Table 7. We
will begin with the pair leo-unemployed. As it may have been expected, conditional on
employers’ choice about job seekers, the labour  exchange office tends to be activated
when unemployment a high (p2),  whereas it tends to be significantly less used when
there is excess demand (that is, even if an unemployed worker is preferred, firms use
other recruitment channels when regional labour  demand is high). Conditional on the
employers’ choice for the recruitment method ( &), the probability of hiring
unemployed applicants is not affected by the condition on the regional labour  market
(that is unemployed job seekers are not preferred in presence of excess of supply, but
they are not impaired either). In this case, different labour  market conditions affect
solely the choice of the search channel. The impact of regional labour  market
conditions is more articulate for the pair leo-employed. Given the employers’ choice
of the plmp of applicants (Q,  employers usually activate the leo when the
unemployment rate is high. On the other hand, given the employers’ choice of the
recruitment strategy (&),  the likelihood of hiring an already employed job seekers is
lower when the unemployment rate is high, while it is higher when the local demand
for labour  is high. This result seems to be consistent with a stronger presence of the
stigma effect in a regional labour  market characterized by excess of demand,
compared to a regional labour  market characterized by high unemployment (excess of
supply).
To summarize the results for the “leo pairs” we may say the following: conditional on
the employers’ choice in terms of applicants’ characteristics, the labour  exchange
office is more likely to be used in periods of high unemployment (for both employed
and unemployed job seekers). Conversely, when the vacancy rate is high the use of
the labour  exchange office turns out to be less likely. Conditional on the employers’
choice of the recruitment strategy, already employed job seekers seem to be selected
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Table 7: Multinomial logit estimates. Reference groups: non unemployed applicants + non leo, and
non employed applicants + non leo (standard errors in parenthesis; *: significant at 5%).
Labour  Exchame Office - Utwnployed
81
-2.50 (0.52)*
ir;!  P(d=l IpLmp)
-2.41 (0.50)*
Labour  Exchange Office - Endoyed
83 Pmlm=ltd) 01
-0.64'(0:31j* -2.58 (0.65)*
52 f'(d=lIplmp)'  - 83 P(plnp=lId)
-2.13 (0.46)* -0.26 (0.26)constant
educational requirements
university -1.02 (0.18)* -0.66 (o.la)* -1.56 (O.lO)* 0.32 (0.23)
secondary -0.75 (0.25)* -0.21 (0.23) -0.94 (0.13)* 0.31 (0.30)
secondary vocational -0.83 (0.16)* -0.43 (0.17)* -0.95 (0.09)* 0.20 (0.21)
primary vocational 0.16 (0.15) 0.26 (0.16) -0.36 (0.08)* 0.34 (0.20)
size/100 -0.12 to.o41* -0.22 (0.05)* -0.06 (0.02)* -0.13 (0.06)*
0.17 (0.16) 1.17 (0.09)*
0.16 (0.21) 0.74 (o.ll)*
0.04 (0.14) 0.83 (0.08)*
0.47 (0.13)* 0.21 (0.08)*
-0.09 (0.04)* 0.08 (0.02)*
econanic sector
industry -0.14 (0.14) 0.06 (0.12) -0.19 (0.08)* 0.37 (0.16)* -0.14 (0.12) 0.01 (0.07)
quaternary 0.45 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.11) 0.10 (0.07) 0.43 (0.15)* 0.21 (o.lo)* 0.08 (0.06)
construction 0.59 (0.15)* -0.49 (0.19)* 0.16 (0.10) -0.61 (0.27)* 0.18 (0.13) -0.14 (0.09)
transportation 0.23 (0.18) -0.30 (0.21) 0.05 (0.11) 0.19 (0.25) 0.07 (0.17) 0.27 (O.lO)*
Labour  market conditions
unemployment rate 0.57 (0.38) 0.93 (0.36)* 0.27 (0.24) 0.10 (0.49) 0.63 (0.32)* -0.43 (0.21)*
vacancies/employment -0.50 (0.23)* -0.48 (0.22)* -0.17 (0.13) -0.16 (0.28) -0.17 (0.20) 0.49 (o.ll)*
wave and year
w2 March-April 0.19 (0.15)
w3 May-June 0.02 (0.16)
w4 July-August -0.03 (0.16)
w5 September-October 0.10 (0.15)
w6 November-December 0.11 (0.16)
1992 0.12 (0.20)
1993 0.33 (0.24)
1994 0.60 (0.22)*
0.03 (0.16)
0.02 (0.16)
0.26 (0.16)
0.18 (0.15)
0.14 (0.16)
-0.09 (0.18)
-0.05 (0.23)
0.25 (0.20)
1.29 (0.64)*
-0.19 (0.09)* 0.16 (0.20) 0.18 (0.14) 0.02 (0.08)
-0.27 (0.09)* -0.24 (0.22) 0.01 (0.14) -0.28 (0.08)*
-0.28 (0.09)* 0.18 (0.20) -0.05 (0.14) -0.31 (o.oa)*
-0.21 (0.09)* 0.06 (0.20) 0.11 (0.14) -0.18 (0.07)*
-0.07 (0.09) 0.22 (0.20) 0.10 (0.14) -0.02 (0.08)
0.13 (0.11) -0.05 (0.24) 0.09 (0.17) 0.11 (0.09)
0.39 (0.14)* -0.12 (0.30) 0.12 (0.21) 0.01 (0.12)
0.49 (o-13)* 0.10 (0.26) 0.26 (0.19) -0.16 (0.10)
a -1.33 (0.56)*
19,118.098
20,092.562
9,900
-2 log likelihood for full model
-2 log likelihood for restricted model
number of observations
16,861.154
17,721.557
9,900
Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given in brackets: required education (primary), economic sector (services), wave (first wave, January-
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when the vacancy rate is high. In contrast, when the unemployment rate is high,
already employed job seekers are less likely to be hired. So far the results are
consistent with what could be expected from our theoretical model (see also Table 1).
Educational requirements again play an important role; their impact appears to be
strong on the outcome of the recruitment process. The conditional probability of
hiring an unemployed candidate is considerably reduced if educational requirements
are high. On the contrary, the conditional probability of hiring an already employed
job seekers is high if the educational requirements are high. On the other hand, the
conditional probability of choosing the labour  exchange office seems to be somewhat
lower when high educational standards are required (as found in Russo et al. 1995b).
Our second main issue concerns the correlation between the choice of the search
channel and the employers’ choice for applicants’ characteristics ( CX).  In concordance
with our prior expectations, we find a significantly positive relationship between the
choice of the labour  exchange office and the option for unemployed applicants, and a
significantly negative relationship between the choice of the labour  exchange office
and the opt ion for already employed applicants. The relationship between
advertisement and the choice for already employed job seekers is also been found but
it is somewhat weaker ( CY  is significant at 10%). A plausible reason for the weakness
of the relationship is that in some cases the use of advertisement can be compulsory
for equity reasons, in these situations unemployed persons (especially long-term ones)
receive a special treatment.
7. Conclusions
The aim of the present paper was to empirically analyze the way employers adjust
their recruitment strategies (in terms of search channel use, and applicants’
characteristics) in response to changes in the overall economic conditions. In
particular we were able to formulate two hypotheses on the nature of  the
adjustments:
(1) The use of the labour  exchange office and the hiring of unemployed candidates
are more likely to happen when there is an excess of supply on the labour
market. The use of advertisements and the hiring of already employed job
seekers are more likely to occur in presence of excess demand.
(2) The process leading to the choice of the recruitment channel and the one
leading to the hiring of an applicant with certain characteristics are correlated.
To test these hypotheses we developed a model in which the impact of the overall
economic conditions and the strength of the relationship between the choice of the
recruitment channel and the employers’ options in term of applicants’ characteristics
can be measured.
The empirical results, based upon a sample of filled vacancies in twelve regions and
over four years, do not reject our hypotheses. We found a significantly positive
relationship between the use of the labour  exchange office and the hiring of
unemployed applicants (leo). Moreover, the choice of the leo appears to be more
likely in presence of excess supply. The consequence at the macro level of such a
behaviour is that in presence of high unemployment the flow into employment mainly
20
generates from unemployment (as observed in Schettkat 1995 and Burda and Wyplosz
1994). We also found a positive (although weaker) relationship between the use of
advertisement and the hiring of already employed job seekers. In addition, the use of
advertisement seems to be more likely in presence of excess demand.
Our results are consistent with an extended theoretical ranking model (Blanchard and
Diamond 1994),  that predicts changes in the hiring pools. An alternative explanation
of the shift in hiring pools (from the pool of unemployed job seekers to the pool of
employed ones) in situations with excess demand is the one modelled  in Pissarides
(1994). In this model the above mentioned shift is driven by an endogenous creation
of good jobs when the economic conditions are favourable. This explanation seems
insupportable in our case. In fact, the rather constant composition of the educational
requirements of the vacancies supports the “ranking” argument.
Finally, our analysis shows the importance of an integrated Macro-Micro approach to
the labour  market.
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Appendix
Table 8: Additional descriptive statistics disaggregated by year and search channel.
1591: 2156 observations
Recruitment freqwncy X average duration  average # hired applicant
Charnel <in days) applicants enployed menployed  school leaver
Informal 695 32.2 35.64 3.09 0.66 0.16 0.18
Advertisement 850 39.4 41.36 16.15 0.74 0.11 0.14
Tpo 207 9.6 26.05 4.04 0.66 0.25 0.10
Leo 169 7.8 45.46 4.80 0.34 0.43 0.22
Others 235 10.9 45.95 6.63 0.59 0.11 0.30
1992: 2651 observations
Recrui tlnent freqwncy X average duration  average # hired applicant
Charnel (in days) applicants enployed menployed  school leaver
Informal 922 34.8 31.78 4.60 0.67 0.19 0.13
Advertisement 928 35.0 42.47 24.30 0.73 0.15 0.12
TPO 247 9.3 22.90 3.65 0.60 0.30 0.10
Leo 246 9.3 30.43 6.15 0.32 0.48 0.20
Others 308 11.6 47.93 5.60 0.48 0.20 0.32
1993: 2486 observations
Recruitment freqwncy X average duration  average t hired applicant
Charnel (in days) applicants enployed menployed  school leaver
Informal 989 39.8 26.80 3.82 0.58 0.25 0.17
Advertisement 632 25.4 45.65 37.59 0.67 0.22 0.12
Tpo 236 9.5 27.08 4.60 0.59 0.30 0.11
Leo 310 12.5 27.30 5.78 0.28 0.51 0.21
Others 319 12.8 42.26 7.58 0.47 0.23 0.30
1994: 2607 observations
Recruitment f-w-y X average duration  average t hired applicant
Charnel (in days) applicants enployed menployed  school leaver
Informal 1107 42.5 26.28 3.43 0.55 0.28 0.17
Advertisement 543 20.8 47.51 46.00 0.64 0.22 0.14
Tpo 206 7.9 29.28 5.58 0.58 0.28 0.14
Leo 419 16.1 26.04 7.44 0.28 0.50 0.22
Others 332 12.7 40.05 6.61 0.39 0.23 0.37
